

# AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION CIRCULAR 35/22

## NOTIFICATIONS ON OVERFLYING CONFLICT ZONES ISSUED BY TRANSPORT CANADA

(Replaces AIC 16/22)

### 1. CONTEXT

- 1.1 The Minister of Transport (MOT) is responsible for the assessment of specific threats concerning flight operations within the framework of the *Aeronautics Act*. Transport Canada, on behalf of the MOT, monitors the security of flight routes used by passenger aircraft and conducts threat assessments when there are changes in the security situation in these routes.
- 1.2 When it is perceived or assessed the State responsible for managing its airspace is not properly mitigating existing risks to commercial aviation, Transport Canada can issue an airspace notification for a risk area, either informative, advisory or prohibitive in nature, under Section 5.1 of the *Aeronautics Act*. Transport Canada's threat assessment methodology is based on a tiered assessment of threat, as described in Section 3.
- 1.3 Airspace notifications issued by Transport Canada apply to Canadian Air Operators (CAO) and Owners of Aircraft Registered in Canada (OARC), and are intended to inform flight planning and operational decision-making.

### 2. PUBLICATION

- 2.1 NAV CANADA, the corporation that operates Canada's civil air navigation service, publishes airspace notifications on behalf of the MOT.
- 2.2 The reporting format follows the standards articulated in the International Civil Aviation Organisation's (ICAO) Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services.
- 2.3 **Notice to Airmen (NOTAM):** when information to be distributed is temporary in nature or time-critical, notifications on conflict zones are published via NOTAM. As per Annex 15 (Standard 6.3.2.3 (n)), the notification is to include information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. The NOTAM will either be cancelled once its validity ceases to apply, or incorporated into an Aeronautical Information Circular, if the information continues to be valid.
- 2.4 **Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC):** if an airspace notification will remain valid for more than 90 days, it will be issued as, or transferred to, an AIC. The notification contained in the AIC remains valid until the MOT makes a change, based on a new risk assessment of the security situation. If a change is deemed necessary, it will be reflected in the next AIC editorial. If the change needs to be communicated before the publication of the editorial, it will be made via NOTAM, which will be rescinded upon issuance of the AIC editorial.

### 3. ISSUANCE

3.1 The issuance of airspace notifications for overflying conflict zones is a tiered-based risk system, as described below:

- **Level 1: Medium risk (INFORMATION / GENERAL ADVICE)** – Advised to take all potential risk information into account in risk assessment and flight routing decisions in the airspace of X country.
- **Level 2: High risk (RECOMMENDATION)** – Recommended to maintain a flight level of X / not to enter the airspace of X country.
- **Level 3: Critical risk (PROHIBITION)** – Prohibited to enter the airspace of X country.

### 4. EXEMPTIONS

4.1 Exceptional waivers for prohibitive notifications may be granted upon motivated request to the competent authority. Affected air operators wishing to obtain such an Authorization must apply to the department of transport at 1-877-992-6853 or 1-613-992-6853 or by email at [Operations.aviation@tc.gc.ca](mailto:Operations.aviation@tc.gc.ca)

4.2 The notifications listed below apply without prejudice to emergency measures that the pilot in command may take in case of absolute necessity.

### 5. INVENTORY OF TRANSPORT CANADA ISSUED NOTIFICATIONS

#### 5.1 **Afghanistan – Level 2 – Issued July 28, 2021**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended not to enter FIR Kabul (OAKX). Potential risk from extremist and militant activity and limited risk mitigation capabilities. Excluded from this guidance are airways P500 and G500 for transiting overflights at or above flight level FL320.

#### 5.2 **Armenia/Azerbaijan – Level 1 – Issued September 15, 2022**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN. Canadian air operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are advised to take all potential risk information into account in their risk assessment and routing decisions when operating in FIR Yerevan Zvartnots (UDDD), and FIR Baku (UBBA). Potential risks from anti-aviation weaponry and military activity along the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

#### 5.3 **Belarus – Level 3 – Issued February 24, 2022**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN BELARUS. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are prohibited from entering FIR Minsk (UMMV). Potential risks from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

#### 5.4 **Ethiopia – Level 1 – Issued November 22, 2021**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are advised to take all potential risk information into account in their risk assessment and routing decisions when operating at a flight level equal to or below flight level FL290 within FIR Addis Ababa (HAAA). Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**5.5 Iran – Level 2 – Issued January 10, 2020**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN IRAN. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended not to enter FIR Tehran (OIIX). Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**5.6 Iraq – Level 2 – Issued November 18, 2021**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN IRAQ. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended to maintain a flight level equal to or above flight level FL320 in FIR Baghdad (ORBB). Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**5.7 Libya – Level 2 – Issued February 18, 2020**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN LIBYA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended not to enter FIR Tripoli (HLLL). Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations created by the current level of internal instability.

**5.8 Moldova – Level 3 – Issued February 24, 2022**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN MOLDOVA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are prohibited from entering FIR Chisinau (LUUU). Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**5.9 North Korea – Level 1 – Issued October 19, 2022**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are advised not to enter FIR Pyongyang (ZKPP). Potential risk to aviation from ballistic missile launches without prior notice.

**5.10 Saudi Arabia – Level 2 – Issued March 11, 2021**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are advised to take all potential risk information into account in their risk assessment routing decisions within FIR Jeddah (OEJD), and not to enter the southwest area of FIR OEJD, in which ESCAT (Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic) rules may be activated by NOTAM from the Saudi authorities. Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**5.11 Somalia – Level 2 – Issued February 9, 2021**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN SOMALIA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended to maintain a flight level equal to or above FL260, within FIR Mogadishu (HCSM). Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**5.12 Syria – Level 2 – Issued February 9, 2020**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN SYRIA. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended not to enter FIR Damascus (OSTT), and to take all potential risk information into account in risk assessment and routing decisions when operating within 200 NM of FIR OSTT. Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

5.13 **Ukraine – Level 3 – Issued February 24, 2022**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN UKRAINE. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are prohibited from entering FIR:

- Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV), Kiev (UKBV), L'viv (UKLV), Odesa (UKOV) and Simferopol (UKFV), in the airspace of Ukraine;
- FIR Rostov (URRV), in the airspace of Russia; and,
- Are prohibited from operating within 200nm of the boundaries of FIR UKDV and FIR UKBV in FIR Moscow (UUWV).

Potential risk from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

5.14 **Yemen – Level 2 – Issued February 9, 2021**

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN YEMEN. Canadian Air Operators and owners of aircraft registered in Canada are recommended not to enter FIR Sana'a (OYSC), northwest of the line created by the waypoints PAKER-ORBAT-NORMA on jet route UT702. Potential risks from anti-aviation weaponry and military operations.

**6. FURTHER INFORMATION**

For further information, please contact:

Transport Canada  
Conflict Zone Information Office  
330 Sparks St., Ottawa, ON  
K1A 0N8

E-mail: [ConflictZoneInfoOffice-BureauInfoZonesConflit@tc.gc.ca](mailto:ConflictZoneInfoOffice-BureauInfoZonesConflit@tc.gc.ca)



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